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By letter of 19 Juny 1990 the Council consulted the European 
Parliament, pursuant to Article 57 (2) first and third sentences, of the EEC 
Treaty, on the proposal from the Commission to the Council for a directive on 
capital adequacy of investment firms and credit institutions. 
At the sitting of 9 July 1990, the President of Parliament announced 
that he had referred this proposal to the Committee on Legal Affairs and 
Citizen's Rights as the committee responsible and to the Committee on Economic 
and Monetary Affairs and Industrial Policy for its opinion. 
At its meeting of 28 Juny 1990, the Committee on Legal Affairs and 
Citizen's Rights had appointed Mr zavvos rapporteur. 
At its meeting of 8 january 1991, the Committee on Legal Affairs and 
Citizen's Rights considered a working document drawn up by the rapporteur and 
held a hearing with experts on that matter. 
At its meeting(s) of 29, 30 and 31 May 1991, it considered the 
Commission proposal and at its meetings of 18, 19 and 20 June 1991 and 15 and 
16 October 1991, it considererd the draft report. 
At the meeting of 29, 30 and 31 October 1991, the Committee on Legal 
Affairs and Citizen's Rights adopted the draft legislative resolution by 19 
votes with 1 abstention. 
The following took part in the vote: Graf Stauffenberg, chairman; 
Vayssade and Simeoni, vice-chairmen; Zavvos, rapporteur ; Casini, Elliott, 
Falconer, Garcia Amigo, Grund, Hadjigeorgiou (for M. Anastassopoulos), Lord 
Inglewood, Janssen van Raay, Marinho, Mebrak-Zaidi, Medina Ortega, Oddy, 
Salema, Saridakis (for M. Cooney), Simpson and Van Outrive. 
The opinion of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and 
Industrial Policy is attached to the present report. 
The report was tabled on 5 November 1991. 
The deadline for tabling amendments will appears on the draft agenda 
for the part-session at which the report is to be considered. 
- 3 - PE 148.282/fin. 
AMENDMENTS 
Proposal for a Council Directive on capital adequacy 
of investment firms and credit institutions 
Commission text (1) Amendments 
DEFINITIONS 
(Amendment n° 1) 
Article 2 
(Second Indent) 
- the "trading book" of a credit 
institution shall include its 
proprietary positions in 
transferable securities of 
derivative instruments, which are 
taken on by the credit institution 
in order to benefit from actual or 
expected differences between their 
buying and selling prices, or in 
order to hedge other elements of 
the trading book; 
- the "trading book" of a credit 
institution shall include its 
proprietary positions in 
transferable securities or 
derivative instruments, which are 
held for resale or which are taken 
on by the credit institutions with 
the intention of benefitting from 
actual or expected differences 
between their buying and selling 
prices or in order to hedge other 
elements of the trading book 
including the activities related to 
these positions as mentioned in 
Annex 2. 
Inclusion or exclusion of items in 
or from the trading book shall be 
in accordance with relevant 
procedures including, where 
appropriate 1 accounting standards 
in the institution concerned, such 
procedures and their consistent 
implementation being subject to 
review by the competent authority. 
(Amendment n°2) 
New indent 
"Zone A, "Zone B" I "Zone A credit 
institutions", "Zone B credit 
institutions", "non bank sector" and 
"multilateral development banks" 
shall be defined in accordance with 
Article 2 of Directive 89/647/EEC. 
(1) COM(90) 0141 final- OJ No C152, 21.6.1990, p. 6. 
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(Amendment no 3} 
(3d indent} 
- exchange-traded instruments" means 
instruments which are traded on, or 
under the ru 1 es of, a stock 
exchange, or financial futures or 
options exchange established and 
officially recognized in the 
relevant Member State, or 
established in a third country and 
recognized by the competent 
authorities of the relevant Member 
State. Instruments whi eh are traded 
on such exchanges and markets shall 
be classified as equities, debt 
instruments, futures, options, 
convertibles and warrants, in the 
Directive. 
(4th indent) 
-"over-the-counter (OTC} 
instruments" means all other 
instruments; 
(4th indent) 
- "over-the-counter (OTC} derivative 
instruments" shall mean interest-
rate and foreign-exchange contracts 
as set out in Annex 3 of Directive 
89/647/EEC and off-balance sheet 
contracts based on equities, 
providing that (i) all such 
contracts are not traded on 
recognized exchanges where they are 
subject to daily margin 
requirements, and (ii}, in the case 
of foreigh-exchange contracts, that 
they have an original maturity of 
more than 14 calendar days. 
(Amendment no 4} 
(5th indent) 
"qualifying issuer" means a credit 
institution, or a firm whose 
securities are listed on a stock 
exchange in a Member State, or in a 
stock exchange in a third country 
when this exchange is recognized by 
the competend authorities of the 
relevant Member State; 
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"A qualifying issuer is a credit 
institution or a firm whose 
securities are 1 i sted on a stock 
exchange in a Member State or 
1 i sted on a stock exchange in a 
third country if the listing 
requirements in that country, as 
well as the requirements concerning 
the "status" of a listed issuer, 
comply with - or are equivalent to 
- the Directive 79/279/EEC and its 
modifications". 
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(Amendment no 5) 
(6th indent) 
- "central government" refers to the 
centra 1 government or centra 1 bank 
of Member States and all other 
countries which are members of the 
Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
and any country which has concluded 
special lending arrangements with 
the international Monetary Fund 
(IMF) associated with the IMF 
General 
(GAB); 
Arrangements to Borrow 
- "central government items" shall 
mean long and short positions in 
the assets referred to in 1. to 4. 
of Article 6 (1) (a), and those 
assigned a weight of 0 % in Article 
7, of Directive 89/647/EEC; 
(Amendment no 6) 
(lOth indent) 
- "repurchase agreement" means an 
agreement in which a firm sells 
securities subject to a commitment 
to repurchase them (or substituted 
securities of the same description) 
at a specified future time and 
price, according to the provisions 
of Article 12 ( 2) of the Council 
Directive 86/635/EEC (OJ no L 372 
31.12.1986, p. 1) 
(11th indent) 
- "reverse repruchase agreement" 
means an agreement in which a firm 
buys securities from a counterparty 
and agrees to sell them (or 
substituted securities of the same 
description) back to that 
counterparty at a specified future 
time and price, according to the 
provisions of Article 12 {2) of 
Directive 86/635/EEC; 
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- "repruchase agreement" and "reverse 
repurchase agreement" means an 
agreement in which a firm transfers 
securities subject to a commitment 
to repurchase them (or substituted 
securities of the same description) 
at a specified price and a future 
date specified, or to be specified, 
by the transferor, shall be a 
"repruchase agreement" for the firm 
selling the securities, and a 
"reverse repruchase agreement" for 
the firm buying them; 
PE 148.282/fin. 
(Amendment n ° 7) 
(17th indent) 
- "Initial capital" means capital as 
defined in points (1) and (2) of 
Article 2 (1) of Directive 
89/299/EEC. The paldup share 
capital component of this shall 
comprise a 11 amounts regardless of 
their actual designations, which, 
in accordance with the legal 
structure of the institution 
concerned, are regarded under 
national law as equity capital 
subscribed and paid by the 
shareholders or other proprietors. 
(16th indent) 
- "Initial capital" means 
defined in Points 1 
Art i c 1 e 2 ( 1) of 
89/299/EEC. (delete the 
capital as 
and 2 of 
Directive 
rest). 
INITIAL CAPITAL AND DEROGATION$ FROM CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS 
(Amendment no 8) 
Article 3 
2. Investment firms shall have 
initial capital of at least ECU 
500.000 
2. Investment firms shall have 
initial capital of at least ECU 
600.000 
(Amendment no 9) 
3. Member States may reduce this 
amount to ECU 50.000 where a firm 
is neither authorised to hold 
customers'monies of securities, nor 
to act as a market maker, nor to 
underwrite except where the firm is 
involved only in the distribution 
of issues on a best efforts basis. 
(Amendment no 
4. Member States may reduce the amount 
in paragraph 2 to ECU lOO. 000 in 
the case of firms who hold 
clients'monies or securities in 
acting as agents or portfolio 
managers, but who do not ho 1 d 
trading positions of their own. 
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3. Member States may reduce this 
amount to ECU 60.000 where a firm 
is neither authorised to hold 
customers' monies or securities, 
nor to act as a market maker, nor 
to underwrite except where the 
firm is involved only in the 
distribution of issues on a best 
efforts basis. 
10) 
4. Member States may reduce the 
amount in paragraph 2 to ECU 
150.000 in the case of firms who 
hold client's monies or securities 
in acting as agents or portfolio 
managers, but who do not hold 
trading positions of their own. 
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(Amendment no 11) 
5. Notwithstanding paragraphs 2, 3 and 
4, Member States may continue the 
authorisation of investment firms 
in existence before this Directive 
is implemented, whose own funds are 
less than the initial capital 
levels specified in those 
paragraphs. The own funds of such 
firms shall not fall below the 
highest level recorded after the 
date of notification of this 
Directive 
5. Notwithstanding paragraphs 2, 3 
and 4, Member States may continue 
the authorisation of investment 
firms in existence before this 
Directive is implemented, whose 
own funds are 1 ess than the 
initial capital levels specified 
in those paragraphs. The own funds 
of such firms shall not fall below 
the highest level recorded at the 
date of not ifi cation of this 
Directive. 
(Amendment no 12) 
Article 3(6) 
If control of an investment firm 
fa 11 i ng within paragraph 5 is taken, 
other than through inheritance, by a 
natural or legal person other than the 
person who controlled it previously, 
attain at least the appropriate level 
prescribed for initial capital in 
paragraph 2, 3 and 4. 
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Article 3(6) 
If control of an investment firm 
falling within paragraph 5 is taken, 
other than through inheritance, by a 
natural or l ega 1 person other than 
the person who controlled it 
previously, attain at least the 
appropriate level prescribed for 
initial capital in paragraph 2, 3 and 
4, save that, in the case where 
paragraph 3 applies, if the business 
is so 1 d during a period of 5 years 
following the implementation of this 
directive, paragraph 5 applies. 
PE 148.282/fin. 
7. 
(Amendment no 13) 
However, in certain specific 
circumstances and with the 
consent of the competent 
authorities, where there is a 
merger of two or more 
investment firms, the own funds 
of the firm resulting from the 
merger need not attain the level 
of initial capital referred to 
in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4. 
However the own funds of the new 
investment firm may not fall 
below the total own funds of the 
merged firms at the time of the 
merger, as long as the 
appropriate levels pursuant to 
paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 have not 
been attained. 
7. However, in certain specific 
circumstances and with the 
consent of the competent 
authorities, where there is a 
merger of two or more investment 
firms, the own funds of the firm 
resulting from the merger need 
not attain the level of initial 
capital referred to in paragraphs 
2, 3 and 4. However, during a 
period when the 1 eve 1 s referred 
to in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 have 
not been attained, the own funds 
of the new investment firm may 
not fall below the total own 
funds of the merged firms at the 
time of the merger. 
PROVISION AGAINST RISKS 
2. 
(Amendment no 14) 
Article 4 
Credit institutions shall 
provide, in addition to the 
requirements set in Directive 
89/647/EEC and any set in 
paragraphs 4 and 5 below, own 
funds to cover their foreign 
exchange risk; this amount shall 
be calculated in accordance with 
the method outlined in Annex 4. 
Pending further harmonisation 
however, Member States may waive 
the application of this 
requirement in relation to 
credit institutions whose 
business is limited as follows : 
their overall net foreign 
exchange position, calculated in 
accordance with Annex 4, must 
not exceed the equivalent of 10 
%of own funds. 
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2. Credit institutions shall 
provide, in addition to the 
requirements set out in Directive 
89/647/EEC and any set out in 
paragraphs 4 and 5 below, own 
funds to cover their foreign 
exchange risk; this amount shall 
be calculated in accordance with 
the method outlined in Annex 3. 
Pending further harmonisation 
however, Member States may waive 
the application of this 
requirement in relation to credit 
institutions whose business is 
limited as follows their 
overall net foreign exchange 
position, calculated in 
accordance with Annex 3, must not 
exceed the equivalent of 2 % of 
own funds. 
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(Amendment no 15) 
Article 4 
Intermediaries investing money on 
behalf of a client with investment 
companies must be covered by 
professsional indemnity. 
EVALUATION OF POSITIONS FOR REPORTING PURPOSES 
(Amendment no 16) 
Article 5 
1. Positions shall be marked to 1. Positions in instruments in 
market da i 1 y by investment firms Section B of the Annex of the 
and credit institutions unless Investment Services Directive 
Annexes 2, 3 and 5 hereto do not which are held by investment 
apply to them. firms which are not ·credit 
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institutions, and the trading 
books of those credit 
institutions which are subject to 
Annexes 1, 2 and 3 below, shall 
be marked to market daily. 
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REPORTING REQUIREMENTS 
2. 
3. 
(Amendment no In 
Article 6 
Investment firms which are not 
credit institutions shall be 
obliged to report to the 
competent authorities in the 
manner specified by the latter 
at least once every month in the 
case of firms which are 
authorised to de a 1 as 
principal, at least once every 
three months in the case of 
those firms described in Article 
3 ( 4), and at 1 east once a year 
in the case of those firms 
covered by Article 3 (3). Such 
reports must be received by the 
competent authorities within two 
weeks of the end of the 
reporting period. 
(Amendment 
Credit institutions shall 
be obliged to report in the 
manner specified by the 
competent authorities at 
the same time as they are 
obliged to report under 
Directive 89/647/EEC, and 
at more frequent intervals 
if the competent 
authorities so request. 
2. Investment firms which are 
not credit institutions shall 
be obliged to report to the 
competent authorities in the 
manner specified by the 
latter at 1 east once every 
month in the case of firms 
which are authorised to deal 
as principal, at least once 
every three months in the 
case of those firms covered 
by Article 3 (4), and at 
least once a year in the case 
of those firms covered by 
Article 3 (4), and at least 
once a 
those 
article 
rest) 
year in 
firms 
3 (3). 
the case of 
covered by 
(Delete the 
3. Credit institutions shall be 
obliged to report in the manner 
specified by the competent 
authorities at the same time as 
they are obliged to report under 
Directive 89/647/EEC, and at more 
frequent intervals if the 
competent authorities so request. 
Credit institutions shall notify 
separately to the competent 
authority the buying and selling 
of the securities excluded from 
their trading book. 
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COMPETENT AUTHORITIES 
4. 
(Amendment no 19) 
Article 7 
The competent authorities of 
different Member States shall 
collaborate closely to carry out 
the duties provided for in this 
Directive, particularly when 
investment services are provided 
on a services basis or by the 
establishment of branches in one 
or more Member States. They 
shall supply one another on 
request with all information 
likely to facilitate the 
supervision of the capital 
adequacy of investment firms and 
credit institutions and 
particularly the verification of 
their compliance to the rules 
laid down in this Directive. 
Any exchange of information 
between competent authorities 
which is provided for in this 
Directive in respect of 
investment firms shall be 
subject to the obligation of 
professional secrecy as set out 
in Article 20 of Directive 
... / ... /EEC (relating to 
investment services} and, in 
respect of credit institutions, 
subject to the obligation set 
out in Article 12 of Council 
Directive 77/780/EEC. 
4. 
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The competent authorities of 
different Member States shall 
collaborate closely to carry out 
the duties provided for in this 
Directive, particularly when 
investment services are provided 
on a services basis or by the 
establishment of branches in one 
or more Member States. They shall 
supply one another on request 
with all information likely to 
facilitate the supervision of the 
capital adequacy of investment 
firms and credit institutions and 
particularly the verification of 
their compliance to the rules 
laid down in this Directive. Any 
exchange of information between 
competent authorities which is 
provided for in this Directive in 
respect of investment firms shall 
be subject to the obligation of 
professional secrecy as set out 
in Article 20 of Directive 
... / ... /EEC (relating to 
investment services} and, in 
respect of credit institutions, 
subject to the obligation set out 
in Article 12 of Council 
Directive 77/780/EEC, as modified 
by Council Directive 89/646/EEC. 
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(Amendment no 20) 
ANNEX 1 
(substituting entirely Annex 1 and Annex 2 of the Commission proposal) 
Position risk 
Equity and debt instruments 
Netting 
(Corresponds to paragraph 1 of Annex 1) 
1. The excess of the firm's long (short} positions over its short (long} 
positions in the same equity, debt and convertible issues, and identical 
financial futures, options and warrants, contracts shall be its net 
position in each of the different instruments. In calculating the net 
position the competent authorities shall allow positions in derivative 
instruments to be treated, in the manner specified in paragraphs 4 to 6 
below, as positions in the underlying (or notional) security/securities. 
(Corresponds to paragraph 4 of Annex 1} 
2. No netting shall be allowed between ~ convertible and an offsetting 
position in the instrument underl~ing it' unless the competent 
authorities adopt an approach under which the likelihood of a particular 
convertible being converted is taken into account, or have a capital 
requirement to cover any potential loss which could be incurred on 
conversion. 
A firm shall split a stock index future into its various constituent 
positions and treat them as it would its underlying positions in the same 
equities. 
However, the competent authorities may deem that the components of a 
stock index future may not be netted off against opposite positions in 
the underlying equities. 
3. All net positions, irrespective of their sign, must be converted on a 
daily basis into the firm's reporting currency at the prevailing spot 
exchange rate before their aggregation. 
Particular instruments 
(Corresponds to paragraph 5 of Annex 1) 
4. Interest rate futures and forward rate agreements (FRAs) will be treated 
as combinations of long and short positions. Thus a long futures 
position will be treated as a combination of a borrowing maturing on the 
delivery date of the futures contract and a holding of an asset maturing 
on the expiration date of the future. The opposite holds for a short 
position. Both the borrowing and asset holding will be included in the 
central government column of Table 1 in paragraph 10. The competent 
authorities may allow the capital requirement for an exchange-traded 
future to be equal to the margin held at the exchange if they are fully 
satisfied that it provides an accurate measure of the risk associated 
with the future. 
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(Corresponds to paragraph 6 of Annex 1) 
5. Options on interest rates, debt instruments, equities, financial futures, 
swaps and foreign currencies, shall be treated as if they were positions 
in the amount of the underlying instrument to which the option refers, 
multiplied by its delta. The delta used shall be that of the exchange 
concerned, or, where this is not available .or for OTC options, that 
calculated by the firm itself, subject to the competent authorities being 
satisfied that the model used by the firm is reasonable. However the 
competent authorities may a 1 so prescribe that investment firms may, or 
must, calculate their deltas using a methodology specified by the 
competent authorities instead of following the two preceding methods. 
The competent authorities shall require that the other risks, apart from 
the delta risk, associated with options are safeguarded against. The 
competent authorities may allow the requirement against a written 
exchange-traded option to be equal to the margin held at the exchange if 
they are fully satisfied that it provides an accurate measure of the risk 
associated with the option, and for the requirement on a bought, 
exchange-traded or OTC option to be the same as that for the instrument 
underlying it, subject to the constraint that the resulting requirement 
does not exceed the market value of the option. The requirement against 
a written OTC option will be set in relation to the instrument underlying 
it. 
(Corresponds to paragraph 8 of Annex 1) 
6. Warrants shall be treated in the same way that options are treated in 
paragraph .§_. 
(Corresponds to paragraph 7 of Annex 1) 
7. Swaps will be treated for interest rate risk purposes on the same basis 
as on-balance sheet instruments. Thus an interest rate swap under which 
a firm receives floating rate interest and pays fixed rate interest will 
be treated as equivalent to a long position in a floating rate instrument 
of maturity equivalent to the period until the next interest fixing, and 
a short position in a fixed.rate instrument with the same maturity as the 
swap itself. Competent authorities may however set alternative 
requirements to these for firms using swap models which provide, to the 
satisfaction of the competent authorities, a more accurate measure of the 
risks in swaps. 
Specific, and general, risks 
8. The position risk on a traded debt instrument or equity (or equity 
derivative) shall be divided into two components in order to calculate 
the capital required against it. The first shall be its specific risk 
component this is the risk of a price change in the instrument 
concerned due to factors re 1 ated to its issuer (in the case of a cash 
instrument) or (in the case of a derivative) the issuer of the underlying 
instrument. The second component will cover its general risk- this is 
the risk of a 
price change in the instrument due (in the case of a traded debt 
instrument) to a change in the level of interest rates, or (in the case of 
an equity or equity derivative) a broad equity market movement unrelated to 
any specific attributes of individual securities. 
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Traded debt instruments 
9. The firm shall classify its net positions according to the currency in 
which they are denominated and shall calculate the capital requirement for 
general and specific risk in each individual currency separately. 
Specific risk 
10. The firm shall assign its net positions, as calculated in paragraph 1, to 
the appropriate categories in the first row of Table 1 on the basis of 
their residual maturities and then multiply them by the weights shown in 
the second row. It shall sum its weighted positions (regardless of whether 
they are long or short) in order to calculate its capital requirement 
against specific risk. 
Table 1 
Central I I government Qualifying Other 
0-6m 6-24m 24m 
0.00% 0.25% 1.00% 1.60% 8.00% 
General risk 
11. The procedure for calculating capital requirements against general risk 
will involve two basic steps. First, all positions shall be weighted 
according to maturity (as explained in paragraph 12), in order to compute 
the amount of capital required against them. Second, allowance will be 
made for this requirement to be reduced when a weighted position is held 
alongside an opposite weighted position within the same maturity band. A 
reduction in the requirement will also be allowed when the opposite 
weighted positions fall into different maturity bands, with the size of 
this reduction depending both on whether the two positions fall into the 
same zone, or not, and the particular zones they fall into. There are 
three zones (groups of maturity bands) altogether. 
12. The firm shall assign its net positions to the appropriate maturity bands 
in the second, or third, column, as appropriate, in Table 2. It will do so 
on the basis of residual maturity in the case of fixed-rate instruments, 
and on the basis of the period until the interest rate is next set in the 
case of instruments on which the interest rate is variable before final 
maturity. It will also distinguish between debt instruments with a coupon 
of 3% or more, and those with a coupon of less than 3%, and thus allocate 
them to either the second or third columns in Table 2. It will then 
multiply each of them by the weight presented for the maturity band in 
question in the fourth column of Table 2. 
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13. It shall then work out the sum of the weighted long positions, and the sum 
of the weighted short positions, in each maturity band. The amount of the 
former which are matched by the latter in a given maturity band will be the 
weighted matched position in that band, while the residual long or short 
position will be the weighted unmatched position for the same band. The 
total of the weighted matched positions in all bands will then be 
calculated. 
14. The firm shall compute the totals of the weighted unmatched long positions, 
for the bands included in each of the zones in Table 2, in order to derive 
the weighted unmatched long position for each zone. Similarly, the sum of 
the weighted unmatched short positions for each band in a particular zone 
will be summed to compute the weighted unmatched short position for that 
zone. That part of the weighted unmatched long position for a given zone 
that is matched by the weighted unmatched short position for the same zone 
will be the weighted matched position for that zone. That part of the 
weighted unmatched long, or weighted unmatched short, position for a zone, 
that cannot be thus matched, shall be the weighted unmatched position for 
that zone. 
Table 2 
1 I 2 I 3 I 4 I 5 
Zones Maturity bands Weights (%) Assumed Interest 
rate change (%) 
Coupon of Coupon of 
3% or more less than 3%~1 
modified duration· 2 
0-lm 0-1m 0.00 ---
One l-3m 1-3m 0.20 1.00 
3-6m 3-6m 0.40 1.00 
6-12m 6-12m 0.70 1.00 
1-2y 1.0-1. 9y 1.25 0.90 
Two 2-3y 1.9-2.8y 1. 75 0.80 
3-4y 2.8-3.6y 2.25 0.75 
4-5y 3.6-4.3y 2.75 0.75 
5-7y 4.3-5.7y 3.25 0.70 
7-10y 5.7-7.3y 3.75 0.65 
Three 10-15y 7.3-9.3y 4.50 0.60 
15-20y 9.3-10.6y 5.25 0.60 
20y 10.6-12.0y 6.00 0.60 
12.0-20.0y 8.40 0.60 
20y 13.0 0.60 
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15. The amount of the weighted unmatched long (short) position in Zone One 
which is matched by the weighted unmatched short (long) position in Zone 
Two shall then be computed. This shall be referred to in paragraph 19 as 
the weighted matched position between Zones One and Two. The same 
calculation will then be undertaken with regard to that part of the 
weighted unmatched position in Zone Two which is left over, and the 
weighted unmatched position in Zone Three, in order to calculate the 
weighted matched position between Zones Two and Three. 
16. The firm may, if it wishes, reverse the order in paragraph 15 so as to 
calculate the weighted matched position between Zones Two and Three,before 
working out that between Zones One and Two. 
17. The remainder of the weighted unmatched position in Zone One shall then be 
matched with what remains of that for Zone Three after this zone's matching 
with Zone Two, in order to derive the weighted matched position between 
Zones One and Three. 
18. Residual positions,following the three separate matching calculations in 
paragraphs 15 to 17 above, will be summed. 
19. The firm's capital requirement shall be calculated as the sum of: 
a) 10% of the sum of the weighted matched positions in all maturity bands; 
b) 30% of the weighted matched position in Zone One; 
c) 20% of the weighted matched position in Zone Two; 
d) 20% of the weighted matched position in Zone Three; 
e} 30% of the weighted matched position between Zones One and Two, and 
between Zones Two and Three (see paragraph 16}; 
f) 100% of the weighted matched position between Zones One and Three; 
g) 100% of the residual weighted unmatched positions. 
Duration 
(Corresponds to paragraph 4 of Annex 2} 
20. Competent authorities in a Member State may use a system for ea 1 cul at i ng 
the capital requirement for the general risk on their firms' (fixed-rate), 
traded debt instruments, which reflects duration, instead of the system set 
out in paragraphs 11 to 19 above. 
21. Under such a system the investment firm shall first work out which residual 
maturity zone each of its debt instruments (e.g. bonds) fall into. It 
shall do this on the basis of the second column of Table 2. 
22. It shall then take the market value of the bond (or other instrument) and 
calculate its yield-to-maturity, which is the implied discount rate for the 
bond. 
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23. The firm shall then calculate its "modified duration" on the basis of the 
following formula: 
and 
modified duration - duration (D) where 
(1+r) 
m 
te 
D - t-1 O+r)f 
m 
t-1 
et 
(1+r)t 
r = yield to maturity 
et = cash payment in time t 
24. The firm wi 11 then determine the interest change that must be covered 
against for a bond of that particular modified duration. It shall refer to 
the third column of Table 2 in order to arrive at this amount. 
25. If the interest rate change is equal to 1% it will multiply the market 
price of the bond by its modified duration in order to ea 1 cul ate the 
duration-weighted position in that bond. If however the interest rate 
change is not 1%, the market price of the bond must be multiplied by both 
its modified duration and the percentage change in guest ion, in order to 
compute the duration-weighted position in that bond. 
26. The investment firm will work out its duration-weighted long, and its 
duration-weighted short, positions within each zone, on the basis of the 
residual maturities of such positions. The amount of the former which are 
matched by the latter within each zone shall be the weighted duration-
matched position for that zone. The firm shall then calculate the 
duration-weighted unmatched positions for each zone. It shall then follow 
the procedures laid down for weighted unmatched positions in paragraph 15 
to 18 above. 
27. The firm's capital requirement shall then be calculated as the sum of: 
a) 10% of the sum of the weighted duration-matched position in each zone; 
b) 30% of the weighted duration-matched po~itions between Zones One and 
Two, and between Zones Two and Three; 
c) 100% of the weighted durat i on-matc~~~t i on~ __ getween Zones One and 
Three; 
d) 100% of the residual weighted duration-unmatched ~j_t_io~. 
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28. Competent authorities which choose to use the system described in 
paragraphs 21 to 27 above shall make details of it publicly available. 
Equities 
(Corresponds to paragraphs 5 and 6 of Annex 2) 
29. The firm shall sum all its net - according to paragraph 1 - long positions, 
and all its net short positions. The sum of the two figures wi 11 be its 
overall gross position. The excess of one over the other shall be its 
overall net position. 
30. It will multiply its overall gross position by 4% in order to calculate its 
capital requirement against specific risk. Its capital requirement against 
general risk shall be its overall net position multiplied by 8%. 
31. The competent authorities may allow the capital requirement against 
specific risk to be 2%, and not 4%, of the overall gross requirement, for 
those portfolios of equities that a firm holds that meet the following 
conditions. First, the equities therein shall all be those of issuers 
which have issued traded debt instruments which are qualifying items and 
which are outstanding. Second, they must be adjusted highly liquid by the 
competent authorities concerned. Third, no individual position within such 
a portfolio shall comprise more than 5% of the value of the overall gross 
position of the portfolio. 
32. The competent authorities shall ensure that firms which have netted off 
their positions in one or more of the equities constituting a stock index 
future against opposite position(s) in the stock index future itself have 
adequate capital to cover the risk of loss arising from the value of the 
future not moving fully in line with that of its constituent equities. 
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(Amendment n· 21) 
ANNEX 2 
(substituting entirely Annex 3 of the Commission proposal) 
Counterparty/settlement risk 
1. In the case of transactions in which bonds and equities (excluding 
repurchase and reverse repurchase agreements) are unsettled after their due 
delivery dates, a firm must calculate the price difference to which it is 
exposed. This is the difference between the agreed settlement price for 
the bond or equity in question, and its current market value,where the 
difference could involve a loss for the firm. It must multiply this 
difference by the appropriate factor in Column A of Table 1 in order to 
calculate its capital requirement. 
2. Notwithstanding paragraph 1, a firm can at the discretion of its 
competent authorities, calculate its capital requirements by multiplying 
the agreed settlement price of every transaction which is unsettled between 
5 and 45 days after its due date, by the appropriate factor in Column B of 
Table 1. From 45 or more days after the due date it shall take the 
requirement to be 100% of the price difference to which it is exposed, as 
in Column A. 
Table 1 
Number of days after Column A Column B 
due settlement date % % 
5-15 8 0.5 
16-30 50 4.0 
31-45 75 9.0 
46 + more 100 see para. 2 
Repurchase agreements 
(Corresponds to paragraph 3 of Annex 3) 
3. In the case of repurchase and securities 1 ending agreements the firm's 
capital requirement shall be the difference between the market value of the 
securities, and the amount borrowed by the firm or the collateral including 
the margin received or the market value of the collateral, where this 
difference is positive. In the case of reverse repurchase and securities 
borrowing agreements it shall be the difference between the amount the firm 
has lent or the collateral or the market value of the collateral given and 
the market value of the securities it has received, where this difference 
is positive. Accrued interest shall be included in calculating the market 
value of amounts lent or borrowed and collateral. 
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OTC derivative instruments 
4. Where there is a separate bilateral contract for novation, recognized by 
the nation a 1 supervisory authorities, between a firm and its counterparty 
under which any obligation to each other to deliver payments in their 
common currency on a given date are automatically amalgamated with other 
similar obligations due on the same date, the single net amount fixed by 
such novation is weighted, rather than the gross amounts involved. 
(Corresponds to Paragraph 4 of Annex 3) 
The requirement shall be calculated as follows: first the firm will sum (i) 
the total replacement cost (obtained by marking to market) of all its 
contracts, including bought equity option contracts, with positive values 
and ( i i), in the case of interest rate and exchange rate contracts, an 
amount for potential future credit exposure, calculated by multiplying the 
total notional principal amount of its contracts by the following weights, 
as appropriate: 
Residual maturity 
less than one year 
one year and over 
Interest rate 
contracts 
0.5% 
The capital requirement will be 
Exchange rate 
contracts 
1.0% 
5.0% 
4% of the sum of ( i) and ( i i) where the counterparty is in the private 
sector, but not a credit institution, or an investment firm, 
1.6% of the sum where it is a credit institution, an investment firm, or in 
the public sector, and 
zero if it is the central government. 
5. A firm shall be required to hold capital against counterparty risk if: 
i) it has paid for securities before receiving them or if it has delivered 
securities before receiving them or if it has delivered securities before 
receiving payment for them, and 
ii) three days or more have elapsed since it made this payment or delivery. 
Thereafter an investment firm which is a credit institution shall be 
required to hold 8% of the value of the securities or cash owed it as 
capital where the counterparty is in the private sector, but not a credit 
institution, or an investment firm, and 1.6% of the sum where it is a 
credit institution, an investment firm, or in the other public sector, and 
zero if it is the central government. An investment firm which is not a 
credit institution shall treat it as an illiquid asset in Annex 5. 
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(Amendment no 22} 
ANNEX 3 
(substituting entirely Annex 4 of the Commission proposal} 
Foreign exchange risk 
1. The overa 11 net foreign exchange position, ea 1 cul ated in accordance with 
the procedures set out below, shall be assigned an 8% capital requirement 
only to the extent that this position exceeds 2% of total own funds. 
2. A two-stage calculation shall be used. 
3. First, the firm's net open currency position in each currency (including 
the reporting currency} shall be calculated. This position shall consist 
of the addition of the following elements (positive or negative}: 
- the net spot position (i.e. all asset items less all 1 iabil ity items, 
including accrued interest, in the currency in question}; 
-the net forward position (i.e. all 
amounts to be paid under forward 
currency futures and the principal on 
spot position}; 
amounts to be received 1 ess a 11 
exchange transactions, including 
currency swaps not included in the 
-guarantees (and similar instruments} that are certain to be called and 
are irrevocable; 
- net future income/expenses not yet accrued but already fully hedged (at 
the discretion of the reporting institutions and with the prior consent 
of the competent authorities, those next future income/expenses which 
have not yet been registered in the accounting records, but which have 
already been fully hedged by forward foreign exchange transactions may be 
included here. Such discretion must be based on a consistent basis}; 
- the net delta (or delta-based} equivalent of the total book of foreign 
currency options; 
- any positions which a credit institution or investment firm has 
deliberately taken in order to hedge against the adverse effect of the 
exchange rate on its capital, may be excluded from the calculation of net 
open currency positions. Such positions should be of a non-trading or 
structural nature, and their exclusion, and any variation of the terms of 
their exclusion, shall require the consent of the competent authorities. 
The same treatment subject to the same conditions as above may be applied 
to positions which a credit institution or investment firm has which 
relate to items that are already deducted in the calculation of own 
funds; 
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(Amendment no 23) 
ANNEX 4 
(substituting entirely Annex 5 of the Commission proposal) 
Other risks 
Investment firms, excluding credit 
institutions, shall be required to 
hold own funds equivalent to one 
quarter of their previous year's 
fixed overheads. The competent 
authorities may adjust this 
requirement in the event of a 
material change to a firm's business 
si nee the previous year. When the 
firm has not completed a year's 
business, including on the day it 
starts up, the requirement will be a 
quarter of the fixed overheads' 
figure projected in its business 
plan, unless an adjustment to this 
plan is required by the authorities. 
For firms that are starting up, own 
funds shall be greater than or equal 
to this amount, and initial capital 
at least equal to the requirements 
laid down in Article 3. 
Investment firms, excluding credit 
institutions, shall be required to 
hold own funds equivalent to one 
quarter of their previous year's 
fixed overheads. The competent 
authorities may adjust this 
requirement in the event of a 
material change to a firm's business 
since the previous year. When the 
firm has not completed a year's 
business, including on the day it 
starts up, the requirement will be a 
quarter of the fixed overheads' 
figure projected in its business 
plan, unless an adjustment to this 
plan is required by the authorities. 
(The rest deleted) 
(Amendment no 24) 
ANNEX 5 
(Corresponds to Annex 6 of the Commission proposal: 
points 1 to 5(1) unchanged 
(2) The subordinated loan capital 
referred to in 4(5) shall have an 
initial maturity of at least two 
years. It shall be fully paid-up 
and the loan agreement shall not 
include any clause providing 
that, in specified circumstances, 
other than the winding-up of the 
investment firm, the debt will 
become repayable before the 
agreed repayment date, unless the 
supervisory authorities agree to 
it having been given two days' 
notice. Subordinated debt may 
not be repaid if such repayment 
would mean that the own funds of 
the firm 120% of the firm's 
overall requirement. 
- n -
(2) The subordinated loan capital 
referred to in 4(5) shall have an 
initial maturity of at Jeast two 
years. It shall be fully paid-up 
and the loan agreement shall not 
include any clause providing 
that, in specified circumstances, 
other than the winding-up of the 
investment firm, the debt will 
become repayable before the· 
agreed repayment date, subject to 
the approval of the competent 
authorities. Subordinated debt 
may not be repaid if such 
repayment would mean that the own 
funds of the firm 100% of the 
firm's overall requirement. 
(3) The subordinated loan capital 
referred to in 4(5} may not 
exceed a maximum of 250% of the 
sum total of items 4(2) plus 4(4} 
less 4(3) and should only 
approach this maximum in 
particular circumstances 
acceptable to the relevant 
competent authorities. 
(4) Illiquid assets include: 
- fixed assets {except to the 
extent that land and buildings 
are allowed to count against 
secured loans); 
(3} The subordinated loan capital 
referred to in 4(5) may not 
exceed a maximum of 250% of the 
sum total of items 4(2) plus 4(4} 
less 4(3) and should only 
approach this maximum in 
particular circumstances 
acceptable to the relevant 
competent authorities. 
{4) Illiquid assets include: 
- fixed assets (except to the 
extent that land and buildings 
may be allowed to count against 
the 1 oans which they are 
securing); 
{Amendment no 25) 
Annex 6 - Own funds 
para 4 (7) 
{7) plus any unencumbered property 
or equity within the business. 
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DRAFT LEGISLATIVE RESOLUTION 
(Cooperation procedure: first reading) 
embodying the opinion of the European Parliament on the proposal from the 
Commission to the Council for a directive 
on capital adequacy of investment firms and credit institutions 
The European Parliament 
having regard to the Commission proposal to the Council (COM(90)0141 final 
- SYN 257) ( 1 ) I 
having been consulted by the Council pursuant to Article 57(2) of the EEC 
Treaty (C3-0184/90), 
having regard to the report of the Committee on Legal Affairs and Citizens' 
Rights and the opinion of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs 
and Industrial Policy (A3-0298/91), 
having regard to the Commission position on the amendments adopted by 
Parliament, 
1. Approves the Commission proposal in accordance with the vote thereon; 
2. Calls on the Commission to amend its proposal accordingly, pursuant to 
Article 149(3) of the EEC Treaty; 
3. Calls for the conciliation procedure to be opened if the Council should 
intend to depart from the text approved by Parliament; 
4. Asks to be consulted again should the Council intend to make substantial 
modifications to the Commission proposal; 
5. Calls on the Council to incorporate Parliament's amendments in the common 
position that it adopts in accordance with Article 149(2) (a) of the EEC 
Treaty; 
6. Instructs its President to forward this opinion to the Council and 
Commission. 
(1) OJ No C152, 21.6.1990, p. 6 
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EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The European Community's 1992 programme for the 
creation of a single European market has been an 
unqualified success. A key component of this endeavour 
is financial integration including the liberalisation of 
securities markets. 
The momentum achieved by developments in financial 
services until now place Europe in a position to overcome 
the fragmentation of financial markets that has for so 
long deprived the consumer of high-quality services and 
industry of competitive financing. The EC urgently needs 
a unified securities market since it is the only entity 
capable of ensuring cheap financing for European industry 
in times of capital scarcity and increasing international 
competition. 
The proposed Council Directive on the Adequacy of 
Own Funds of Investment Firms and Credit Establishments1 
is the companion measure to the Amended Proposal for a 
Council Directive on Investment Services in the 
Securities Field2 . Together, these two measures create 
a regime of regulatory prudence whose object is the 
protection of the soundness of the financial system as a 
- whole and of the individual investor in particular. 
The aim of these two Directives is to permit 
investment firms licensed in one Member states to enjoy 
free access to the financial markets of every other 
Member State, whether it be for the issuance of 
securities or with a view to the provision of investment 
services. This "single license" for investment firms is 
to be created on the basis of settled conditions parallel 
to those provided for credit institutions (banks) by the 
Second Banking Coordination Directive. 
The division of functions between the Investment 
Services Directive and the Capital Adequacy Directive is 
parallel to that between the Second Banking Coordination 
Directive on the one hand and the Own Funds and Solvency 
Ratio Directives on the other. The proposed Investment 
Services Directive would provide an investment firm 
licensed in one of the Member States a single license to 
provide its services in every other Member state. The 
Capital Adequacy Directive, on the other hand, would 
effect the minimum harmonization of supervisory standards 
governing the provision against the risk an investment 
firm assumes sufficient to allow the Member States to 
1 (COM(90)141- SYN 257) [Hereinafter the Capital 
Adequacy Directive]. 
2 (COM(89)629 final - SYN 176) (Hereinafter, the 
Investment Services Directive]. 
I,' 
1 
mutually recognize 
supervisory regimes. 
each others' regulatory and 
It is essential to see these two Directives as a 
single part of a larger package, including the three 
Directives on credit institutions mentioned above. The 
single license to be conferred by the Investment Services 
Directive cannot operate without the harmonisation the 
Capital Adequacy Directive is to achieve. And the single 
license given to credit institutions by the Second 
Banking Coordination Directive and its accompanying 
measures would actually disrupt the competitive structure 
of the Community's financial services industry if similar 
freedom were not given to investment services firms. 
Without the Investment Services and Capital Adequacy 
Directives, Community credit institutions would be able 
to operate freely in every Member State, while the non-
bank investment firms against which they compete would 
not. Thus, the coherence of the Community's regulatory 
regime for the entire financial services industry turns 
upon the timely promulgation of these two pieces of 
legislation. 
Equally important, these measures are the means by 
which financial services firms, whether bank or non-bank, 
are to enjoy the benefits of a single European Market. 
Only by removing the regulatory barriers between the 
markets of the several Member States can the Community's 
financial services industry achieve the economies of 
scale and geographical diversification that other sectors 
enjoy by virtue of the single market programme. 
The legislative programme compr1s1ng these two 
directives must operate within two constraints. First, 
they ought to put on an equal footing investment firms 
which are banks and those which are not. The rules 
provided for by the Directives should not influence a 
firm's decision to choose one institutional structure 
over another. On the contrary they should create a level 
playing field between the two banking structures 
prevalent in the Community: Germany's universal banking 
and the UK's bifurcated structure. Second, the 
Directives ought to enhance, or at least ought not to 
impair, the competitiveness of Europe as a financial 
centre. 
II. THE REGULATION SECURITIES FIRMS IN THE EUROPEAN 
COMMUNITY 
A. Regulatory Aims 
1. Investor Protection 
It is generally accepted that investors should be 
free to assume what risks they wish and suffer the losses 
thereon, provided that they are informed of the nature 
and extent of such risks. There is an exception to this 
' . 
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general rule, however, in that investors should not have 
to bear the risk of loss caused by the default of the 
securities firm through which they transact their 
business. To relieve the investor of this risk, many 
countries demand that investment firms participate in 
investor protection schemes which will compensate 
investors for losses incurred as a result of a firm's 
default. The Proposed Investment Services Directive 
adopts this approach in its Article 11 ( 1) • To further 
insulate the investor, the same provision requires that 
the cash and securities of the firm and those of its 
customers be held separately. 
2. Protection of Those with Whom the Firm 
Does Business. 
It is often thought that regulation is essential to 
reassure other firms of the safety of an investment firm. 
Without regulation, it is argued, other market 
participants will be unwilling to deal with an investment 
firm because they will be unable to monitor the firm's 
financial condition. One may doubt that this is in fact 
the case, but this argument is nonetheless very 
frequently put forward as a rationale for regulating 
securities firms. 
3. Protection of the Financial System 
A third rationale for the regulation of investment 
firms argues that a failure by one could potentially 
destabilise the entire financial system, including under 
that rubric investor confidence in the securities markets 
and the smooth functioning of the clearing and settlement 
systems. It is this theory that underlies much of the 
recent efforts, both in the European Community and 
elsewhere, toward shoring up the stability of investment 
firms through regulation. 
B. The Regulation of Banks and Securities Firms. 
Banks and securities firms face different types of 
risks, which require separate regulation. Banks 
generally hold assets (loans) until they mature. 
Securities firms, on the other hand, rapidly turn over 
their holdings in the course of their everyday 
activities. In other words, banks assets are less liquid 
than those of securities firms. The two types of 
institutions are therefore exposed to different risks. 
Banks face credit risk, the risk that the debtor will not 
pay. This is much less important to securities firms for 
they can simply sell the debts owing to them on the 
market. More important for them is market risk, the risk 
that they will have to sell at a lower price than they 
bought. This difference between the two sorts of 
institutions is reflected in their valuation. Whereas 
securities firms are evaluated on the basis of their 
liquidation value, banks are assessed as going concerns. 
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This reflects the ability of a securities firm to change 
its risk exposure rapidly by selling its assets. The 
risk profile of a bank, whose assets are much less 
liquid, is much more resistant to change. 
These different risks mandate different regulatory 
techniques. In financial straits, a securities firms is 
expected to shrink, which it may do so long as its assets 
are in liquid form. The regulator must, therefore, 
ensure that these assets remain liquid. The same avenue 
of escape is unavailable to banks, for the illiquid 
nature of their assets means that they can be sold 
rapidly only at a substantial loss, thus compounding the 
institution's problems rather than solving them. A bank 
regulator's aim, then, is to keep the bank afloat by 
giving it time to restore its impaired capital. To this 
end, a bank's capital must be permanent in nature. A 
securities firm's can be more flexible, if only because 
it has the option of shrinking its way out of danger. As 
a result, securities firms are usually able to rely more 
heavily on subordinated debt as capital. The Proposed 
Directive on Capital Adequacy contains just such a 
provision. 
c. Different Member States Maintain Different 
Financial Structures. 
Community Member States now maintain widely 
different structures in their financial industries. 
Germany, for example, permits universal banking. A 
financial institution may undertake both commercial and 
investment banking activities within the same corporate 
entity. In the United Kingdom, on the other hand, 
supervisory authorities prefer that the same entity not 
transact both kinds of business. Instead it is more 
common for securities business to be performed through a 
subsidiary enjoying a separate legal personality from the 
parent. 
The Proposed Directive on Capital Adequacy would 
maintain a level playing field between the universal 
banks and bifurcated financial institutions by permitting 
Member States to choose between the definition of capital 
set forth in the Banking Directives and new rules 
specially tailored to the needs of the securities 
industry. Banks active on the securities markets may, 
at the option of their Member State, continue to apply 
the banking definition of capital to all their business, 
or they may separate their securities business out into a 
"trading book", to which the alternative capital 
definition applies. 
III. THE CAPITAL ADEQUACY DIRECTIVE 
A. Aims of Capital Adequacy. 
4 
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Capital adequacy describes the system of rules 
supervisory authorities apply to assure that the 
financial institutions under their supervision have 
adequate reserves to cover the risks they assume in the 
course of their business. The aim is always a delicate 
balance. On the one hand, the greater the reserves 
required, the safer is the institution, its depositors, 
and, to that extent, the financial system as a whole. 
Yet capital requirements are a burden upon such firms. 
Funds held in reserve could usefully be invested. If too 
much in the way of reserves is required, a firm will be 
placed at a competitive disadvantage vis a vis firms 
facing lower requirements, who can put a greater 
percentage of their resources to work. Thus, the task of 
the regulator is to ensure the safety of the firms under 
its control while not putting them out of business. The 
Directive seeks to harmonise the rules by which the 
Member State supervisors are to accomplish this task. 
The Directive applies to investment firms 
credit institutions. It fixes two different 
requirements for investment firms and for 
portions of the business of credit institutions. 
B. Initial Capital 
and to 
capital 
certain 
Article 3 contains the initial capital requirements 
an investment firm which is not a credit institution must 
satisfy in order to be granted a license in any of the 
Member States. Certain reductions are provided with 
respect to firms that do not handle client' moneys and 
certain other firms. These reductions in capital 
requirements reflect the lesser risk to which these firms 
are exposed. Moreover, existing firms are grandfathered 
and will not have to meet the Directive's initial funds 
requirement in order to retain their licenses. They 
will, however, have to meet these requirements if they 
wish to expand into Member States other than the ones in 
which they currently operate. 
As drafted, Article 3 requires lower initial capital 
for investment firms than is required for banks. This 
constitutes an inequality between the two sorts of 
institutions. But this inequality is justified: banks 
by their nature are eligible for a wider range of 
activities than are investment institutions. 
Accordingly, banks need rather more initial capital to go 
into business in the first place. One may argue that 
diversification should lead to lower capital 
requirements, but this consideration is already taken 
into account in the calculation of operating capital 
requirements. To make the same concession in initial 
capital requirements would accord diversification double 
weight. Given the recent crises in the international 
securities markets and the situation in the majority of 
the Member States the Rapporteur suggested a slight 
increase over the proposal's initial capital requirement. 
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Second, the Directive provides rules on the capital 
an investment firm must retain against the risks it 
assumes. 
c. The Trading Book Option 
The key provision of the Directive is found in 
Article 4 ( 4) : the trading book option. This provision 
is the means by which competitive equality is to be 
maintained between financial service firms which are 
banks and those which are not. By way of background, 
investment firms which are credit institutions will be 
required to meet the requirements of the Solvency Ratio 
Directive when that measure comes into force. The 
Solvency Ratio Directive will not apply to investment 
firms that are not credit institutions. To prevent such 
firms from being subjected to different capital 
requirements, article 4(4) of the Capital Adequacy 
Directive would permit Member states the option to 
subject their credit institutions, on general or 
individual bases, to substitute the requirements of the 
Capital Adequacy Directive for those of the Solvency 
Ratio Directive with respect to certain types of risks 
they incur in their 11 trading book 11 • Thus, at the option 
of the Member State, credit institutions and other 
financial services firms can be subjected to the same 
capital requirements with respect to the same risks. 
It has been suggested that the option be given to 
the institutions themselves rather than to the regulators 
of the Member states. The argument is that, if either 
the Solvency Ratio or Capital Adequacy approaches are 
sound and will satisfy Community law, the firms 
themselves should have the choice. However this argument 
cannot stand because it presumes de facto harmonization 
of Member State supervisory regimes. The reality is 
harmonization to the degree envisioned by the argument 
granting firm's the option does not currently exist. 
Therefore the Member States cannot depend on firms 
themselves to ensure the soundness of the firms under 
their control. Member States should be allowed to retain 
the option for themselves. 
D. The Mechanism of Capital Adequacy 
Risks are identified in the Annexes of the 
Directive. Article 4(1) provides that the total capital 
investment firms are required to hold is the sum of the 
requirements against the specific risks listed in these 
Annexes. Thus Annex 2 contains the rules applicable to 
Position Risk, Annex 3 those for CounterpartyjSettlement 
Risks, Annex 4 Foreign Exchange Risk, And Annex 5 Other 
Risks, including Operating Risk. The mechanics of 
determining the total capital required are thus 
relatively straightforward. Consult the provisions of 
Annex 1 to determine the net open position against which 
capital must be held. Then, consult Annexes 2 through 5 
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to determine the capital requirements for each of the 
different types of risk to which the firm is exposed by 
virtue of this open position. Add these figures. The 
result is the total capital the firm must have at any 
given time. 
Annex 1 governs the calculation of net open 
positions. It takes account of the fact that some 
investments are by nature more risky than others. Less 
risky investments need less capital to back them up. 
Several commentators have noted, however, that the 
Directive as drafted paints with too broad a brush in 
classifying "safe" and "risky" instruments. The 
Rapporteur has proposed technical amendments to refine 
the Directive's treatment. 
There is also the question as to whether Annex 1 
sufficiently rewards reduction of risk through hedging. 
By this practice, a firm would take offsetting positions 
whose risk profiles cancel each other out. The Directive 
would grant some relief for hedged positions, but not to 
the full extent that risk is reduced. Hedging is a 
sophisticated financial technique; its use should be 
rewarded in the form of reduced capital requirements. It 
is also, however, highly complex and the Directive would 
have to be substantially augmented to provide for all 
possible permutations. This question can perhaps be 
resolved in connection with the building block approach 
described below. 
Annex 2 sets forth rules on Position Risk applicable 
to all non-bank investment firms. In addition, it 
mandates that credit institutions institute their own 
surveillance systems to monitor and control market risk. 
With respect to these risks, the Member States will have 
to choose to apply either the requirements of the 
Solvency Ratio Directive to their credit institutions or 
the provisions found in this Annex of the Capital 
Adequacy Directive to those transaction of a credit 
institution which make up its trading book. 
E. The Building Block Approach 
As currently drafted, Annex 2 covers two distinct 
sorts of risk: interest rate risk and credit risk. Some 
commentators have therefore suggested separate treatment 
of these risks in different annexes. This is 
colloquially referred to as "the building block 
approach". Separate treatment would more accurately 
reflect economic reality. An uncovered position in a 
security representing a debt, for instance, carries with 
it the risk that the issuer will default. Quite apart 
from questions as to the financial strength of the 
issuer, a fixed-rate debt instrument also remains 
susceptible to changes in prevailing interest rates. 
Such changes affect the discounted present value of the 
future cash flows that the instrument represents to 
fluctuate. Different factors bear on these two sorts of 
. ' 
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risk, so there is at least a theoretical case to be made 
for treating them separately. The same holds true for 
equity securities as well. 
The Rapporteur therefore proposes the adoption of 
the building block approach in lieu of that now found in 
Annex 2 of the proposed Directive. The proposed 
amendments would also have the advantage of incorporating 
the provisions of Annex 1, so both old Annex 1 and Annex 
2 can be rolled into the single new one. The new Annex 
would provide separate treatment for general and specific 
risks. General risk is defined to mean the price risk 
associated with a security due to broad market movements 
unrelated to the attributes of the particular security. 
Specific risk, on the other hand, means the risk of a 
price change in a security due to factors related to its 
issuer. 
By separating risk into general and specific 
categories the Building Block Approach presents several 
advantages as a risk barometer. Under the building block 
approach the specific risk of the issuer can more easily 
be integrated into the Solvency Ratio Directive framework 
for the non-trading book activities of banks. This will 
insure equal treatment regarding capital requirements 
between investment firms and credit institutions. 
The Building Block Approach sets specific risk 
requirements on the net position (long or short) in each 
debt instrument. 
The specific risk requirements differ from those 
under the Solvency Ratio Directive in two ways: 
classification of issuers and allocation of risk weight. 
Unlike the Solvency Ratio Directive which allocates the 
same risk weight to all private sector borrowers, the 
Building Block Approach distinguishes between qualified 
(private) borrowers and others. Nor does the Building 
Block Approach allocate a flat risk weight for qualified 
issuers (and credit institutions) or other public sector 
entities. 
The Building Block Approach deviations from the 
Solvency Ratio Directive framework are justified because 
qualified issues trade on liquid markets where assets can 
be sold on short notice without adverse impact on price, 
i.e. positions are not held until maturity. 
For fixed interest instruments Building Block 
Approach provides for a market price risk requirement 
intended to cover a change in market interest rates. BBA 
suggests a basic method for setting interest rate risk 
requirements as well as a more accurate method for more 
sophisticated firms. Both methods are intended to 
provide equivalent protection against changes in the 
market price of bonds and other fixed rate instruments. 
- · ... c .. 
8 
1- ' 
' '~ 
The Building Block Approach has three principal 
advantages. First, the division of risk into two 
separate components will enable a more precise and 
accurate treatment of sophisticated financial techniques 
like hedging, which are becoming ever more important and 
widespread. Second, the distinction drawn between 
general and specific risk isolates credit risk from other 
sorts of risk. This is considered good practice amongst 
banking regulators. Finally, the version of the building 
block approach proposed here comports well with the 
progress of discussions in Basle on this same subject. 
Annex 3 establishes capital requirements with 
respect to transactions that have been entered into but 
have not yet been concluded. The Directive may be over-
cautious in setting capital requirements against such 
risk. The current rules may significantly affect cross-
border transactions, which generally take at least some 
additional time to clear. As with many of the 
Directive's provisions, the trade-off is one of 
simplicity against accuracy: one could provide a 
separate capital requirement for such transactions, but 
the result would be a very complex provision indeed. Or 
one can have a simple, easy-to-apply rule that may 
overstate capital requirements in some cases. 
Annex 4 applies to all non-bank investment firms and 
to those credit establishment whose net global positions 
exceed 10% of their own funds. It provides that the 
figure of eight percent of positions in foreign exchange 
be held as capital. This copies the provisions of the 
Solvency Ratio Directive governing credit risk with 
respect to foreign exchange transactions. In this 
context, the 8% figure seems excessive as compa~ed with 
the actual risk, for positions in foreign exchange are to 
reevaluated on a daily basis. This figure should 
therefore be reduced. In addition, the 10% threshold 
figure is excessive. Exemption should be granted only to 
those credit institutions whose net global positions 
exceed 2% of own funds. 
Moreover, there is a striking omission in that Annex 
4 makes no allowance in its capital requirements for the 
fact that many currencies, most notably those of the EMS, 
are linked. It is therefore to be expected that foreign 
exchange position between these currencies are subject to 
much less risk than those between unlinked currencies. 
Annex 4 should reduce the capital required to be held 
against these transactions. It would be ironic for a 
Community 'Directive enabling European financial 
institutions to reap the benefits of the Single Market to 
deny them those stemming from the EMS. 
A further issue with respect to foreign-exchange 
risk is the treatment of what are known as structural 
positions. A structural position, as opposed to an 
operating position, may be investment in buildings, 
facilities or networks in another country, investments in 
'I 
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nonfinancial firms in another country or securities held 
only for investment, that is, until they mature. In each 
case, the investment is not subject to the full force of 
exchange rate volatility. Some reflection of this fact 
ought to be made in the calculation of capital 
requirements. 
Annex 5 requires that non-bank investment firms keep 
capital equivalent to one-quarter of their previous 
year's overheads. 
Annex 6 provides the types of capital that may be 
used to satisfy these requirements. As currently 
drafted, the Directive would allow non-bank investment 
firms greater latitude to meet their requirements with 
subordinated debt than credit institutions would enjoy. 
Subordinated debt is allowed to be considered as capital 
for the purposes of the Directive to the extent of 2 1/2 
times equity capital, provided that such debt has an 
initial maturity of at least two years. This option 
would also be available to banks that adopt the trading 
book option to the extent of their trading book. This 
freedom is subject to the constraint use of the 
Directive's alternative definition cannot add more than 
twenty-five percent to the capital that would have to be 
held under the bank definition alone. Banks would not, 
though, be required to deduct illiquid assets from their 
calculations, as would securities firms. 
Article 5 governs the evaluation of open positions. 
Generally, investment firms and credit institutions are 
required to mark their portfolios to market daily. 
Certain Member States retain the use of the historical 
cost method of evaluation: Consider an asset to be worth 
what you paid for it. These Member states have argued 
that they should not be forced to mark-to-market daily, 
but should be left free to apply their own supervision 
systems. These pleas must be rejected. Marking to 
market is a more accurate evaluation of the worth of an 
asset at any given time. Market prices reflect an 
issuer's credit rating and the market's expectations 
about future interest and exchange rates. This more 
accurate evaluation is better suited to the monitoring 
and control of trading activity, where liquidity, not 
solvency, is the aim. And in any event, a bank will not 
have to mark to market unless its Member State adopts the 
trading book option. 
Article 6 establishes the reporting requirements by 
which the competent authorities of the Member states are 
to ensure compliance with the prov1s1ons of the 
Directive. For investment firms, reporting is to be made 
at least monthly, though there are less stringent 
requirements for firms that act only as agents or do not 
hold clients' money or securities. Credit institutions 
must report in accordance with the prov1s1ons of the 
Solvency Ratio Directive. With respect to both 
institutions, Member States must ensure that firms under 
10 
their supervision maintain internal control 
and administrative and accounting procedures 
to allow Member State authorities to monitor 
with the requirements of the Directive. 
mechanisms 
sufficient 
compliance 
Article 7 designates the competent authorities who 
are to implement the Directive's provisions and mandates 
their collaboration with one another to achieve the aims 
of the Directive. 
Article 8 establishes a Committee with powers to 
make certain changes to provision governing capital 
requirements in accordance with procedures set forth in 
the Investment Services Directive. This procedure would 
allow the Commission to approve changes that have been 
rejected by the Council acting by qualified majority. 
The appropriate procedure is instead found in Article 22 
of the Second Banking Directive, where the Commission's 
power is more limited. 
Finally, the Directive is slated to enter into force 
1 January 1993. Thus, the Capital Adequacy, Investment 
Services, Second Banking Coordination, Own Funds, and 
Solvency Ratio Directives will all enter into force at 
the same time. This will assure competitive equality 
between bank and non-bank investment firms. 
IV. CONSOLIDATED SUPERVISION 
The goals of the directive should be viewed in 
relation with the directive on consolidated supervision. 
The idea of preserving competition between credit 
institutions and investment firms underlies the 
supervisory functions of both directives. One cannot 
regulate an investment company as if it were a bank if 
that investment company is to remain competitive with 
other investment companies. 
The European banking and financial services industry 
has seen a tremendous increase in its complexity and 
integration over the past decade. As more and more 
relationships are formed between different institutions, 
regulators face a new and difficult problem, namely, how 
to ensure that whole groups, rather than individual firms 
within such groups, retain their financial soundness. 
Consolidated supervision of credit institutions (banks) 
is widely accepted. What is more controversial, however, 
is the issue of whether securities firms within group 
structures should also be supervised on a consolidated 
basis. 
Banks, and their Member State regulators, argue 
against the exemption of securities firms from 
consolidated supervision on the ground that such 
exemption would unduly penalise the universal banking 
structure vis a vis the bifurcated structure prevalent in 
competing markets. The securities firms respond that 
11 
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simple application of banking rules to securities fi:cms, 
especially in the matter of capital, is unworkable. The 
Solvency Ratio Directive, which governs banks, protects 
against credit risk, whereas the securities business 
needs regulation of market risk. Thus, it is argued, 
straight application of the Solvency Ratio will not 
adequately protect against the risks that the different 
member firms of a group structure actually face. 
There is not as yet any agreed method for the 
consolidated supervision of firms exposed to market risk. 
Different firms in the same group structure could take 
offsetting positions, thus reducing the own funds 
requirement of the groups as a whole. But, should either 
of the firms become insolvent, there would be no legal 
duty owing by either firm to the creditors of the other. 
Indeed, many problems remain to be solved with respect to 
the interaction of banking and nonbanking supervision to 
different types of firms within the same corporate group. 
Significant work remains to be done in this area. 
The largest problem confronting consolidated 
supervision may be the difference between means and 
results. Some members of the financial community have 
argued that it is inappropriate to even attempt to 
separate a bank's securities and conventional banking 
business and to then apply the same capital rules to 
each. The question becomes much more complex when the 
issue is how to separate the securities and conventional 
banking business of a financial services group for 
purposes of supervision. Perhaps a more effective tool 
would be less concerned with the specific rules applied 
and more focused on the results obtained. At a minimum 
consolidated supervision should refrain from creating 
incentives for market participants to structure their 
business so as to avoid regulation. 
Consolidated supervision poses several specific 
problems. First, the current directive excludes from 
consolidation financial institutions whose activities 
expose them to market risks. This omission results in 
' a situation where banks engaged in universal banking will 
be subject to consolidation while their counterpart 
financial institutions who follow a bifurcated system 
will not. This may encourage the diversification of 
portfolios of credit establishments so as to avoid 
consolidation. 
A further problem of particular relevance to the 
Capital Adequacy Directive involves the situation where a 
credit institution parent is not authorized to use the 
trading book option and therefore subject to the Solvency 
Ratio Directive, while an investment firm is by 
definition subject to the requirements of the Capital 
Adequacy Directive. There is debate on whether under 
consolidation, the investment firm may be fully subject 
to Solvency Ratio Directive's capital requirements 
I ' ) ·,.- >-~' .- , ,' 
because the credit institution was not authorized to use 
the trading-book option. In practice this would 
substantially increase the capital requirements of the 
group as a whole without any substantial justification. 
A similar situation would also happen when a credit 
institution is not authorized to use the alternative own 
funds definition under the Capital Adequacy Directive. 
Consolidation would subject the investment firm to a 
banking definition of "own funds" where subordinate debt 
would not qualify as capital. 
A final problem faced by regulators seeking to enact 
consolidated supervision is created by the international 
context. There is no consensus at the international 
level on the way to carryout consolidated supervision of 
market risks. Currently both Japan and the United States 
contemplate allowing banking organization to engage in 
securities activities, but only through separate 
subsidiaries. Neither country plans to apply 
consolidated capital requirements to affiliated banking 
and securities firms. However, the US Treasury Proposal 
would require a bank affiliated with a securities firm to 
meet a higher capital requirement on a solo basis, than 
the 8% capital requirement. If EC credit institutions 
are to be competitive on a global level it is important 
to address the implications of international developments 
with respect to the regulation of financial 
intermediaries. 
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I. OUTLINE OF THE COMMISSION'S PROPOSALS 
A. The Principles of the Directive 
1. This Directive is part of the Commission's programme to achieve a 
Single Market across the Community in Financial Services. Along with 
the proposed Investment Services Directive it is designed to provide 
for the securities business a regulatory framework comparable with 
that granted to the banking business by the Second Banking 
Coordination Directive and the own Funds and Solvency Ratio 
Directives. 
2. Within this context, the Capital Adequacy Directive seeks to protect 
investors and the securities market system as a whole from the failure 
of participating investment houses just as the own Funds and Solvency 
Ratio Directives seek to protect depositors and the credit system as 
a whole from bank failure. 
3. The Capital Adequacy Directive therefore shares with its companion 
Directives the general philosophy of the Commission towards the 
achievement of. a Single Market in Financial Services mutual 
recognition of home country authorization, regulation and supervision 
underpinned by commonly agreed minimum standards. 
4. This philosophy is derived from a political compromise necessitated by 
the great disparity in both the structure and sophistication of the 
financial services industry in the various ·Member States. Prominent 
among the tensions to which such disparity gives rise under the 
pressure of the objective of achieving a European Single Market are 
disparities s 
a) between the interests of the city of London to be the dominant 
financial services centre for the Community analogous to the 
Status of New York in the United States and the interests of 
competing centres such as Frankfurt, Paris or Milan. 
b) between national financial services markets dominated by 
institutions which combine banking and securities operations, 
such as Germany, and those, such as the UK, where a separation 
of function is the norm. 
5. The Capital Adequacy Directive also shares specifically with the Own 
Funds and Solvency Ratio Directives the two key elements of the 
Commission's detailed approach to the protection of clients and the 
financial services system as a whole from the failure of participating 
institutions z 
a) that security should derive from the constant application by the 
supervising authorities of ll clear regulatory framework for a 
free market rather than through tolerating cartels or other 
restrictive practices by investment houses or banks. 
b) that the cost burdens of regulation are outweighed by the 
advantages which superior safety standards provide for the 
clients of financial services and thus community financial 
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institutions and centres should not be disadvantaged as against 
less regulated foreign competitors. 
6. This approach is, in turn, derived from a political compromise 
necessitated by three conflicting trends in the current development of 
the financial services market : 
a) market liberalization, while vastly promoting the 
financial services, has, at the same time, 
undermined traditional operating practices for 
institutions which previously had been the 
business security; 
efficiency of 
progressively 
participating 
basis of the 
b) the tremendous growth in the scale and complexity of the trading 
of financial assets, while in many respects reducing the risk to 
investors and to the market system, through greater liquidity 
and the development of hedging techniques in futures and 
options, has simultaneously increased the volatility of the 
value of securities and thereby the possibility of failure; 
c) the globalization of the provision in financial services, while, 
on the one hand, accelarating the concentration of trading by 
time zone in London, New York and Tokyo and thus the possibility 
of rationalizing international control of the business, has also 
created the risk of regulatory competition and the proliferation 
of off-shore centres seeking to take advantage of the lower 
costs of inferior structures of supervision and thereby threaten 
the security of investors and the international system as a 
whole. 
B. The Structure of the Directive 
1. In seeking to meet these considerations and fulfil these principles, 
the Commission has drawn up a Capital Adequacy Directive with the 
following five key features : 
a) the Treatment of Start Up and Ongoing Capital Requirements; 
b) the Treatment of Banks and Investment Houses in the General 
Conduct of Securities Business; 
c) the Enumeration and Classification of Risks to be regulated; 
d) Accounting and Reporting Requirements of those engaged in the 
Securities Business; 
e) the Definition of Regulatory Capital. 
I 
2. Start Up and Ongoing Capital 
As the minimum start up capital for credit institutions is already 
dealt with by the Second Banking Coordination Directive, which 
requires ECU 5 million, the Directive only applies to non bank 
investment firms• initial capital. 
The minimum start up capital is, as in the Second Banking Coordination 
Directive, not only a requirement for authorization, but also a 
condition for maintaining the authorization of an investment firm. 
Firms already authorized before the date of implementation may, 
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Some categories of low risk investment firms, such as locals on 
financial future markets or firms offering only investment advice, are 
excluded both from initial and ongoing capital requirements. In 
principle the minimum start up capital is set at ECU 500 000. However, 
Member States are given the option of reducing that amount to ECU 
100 000 or to 50 000 for firms which do not engage in certain 
activities. 
3. The treatment of banks and investment houses in the general conduct of 
securities business 
The Directive offers supervising authorities several 
including that of allowing them to choose whether they impose 
trading book, the capital requirements of this Directive 
emanating from the Solvency Ratio Directive instead. 
options, 
a bank's 
or those 
The trading book is defined in such a way that a bank knows whether to 
allocate a position to its investment book or to its trading book 
immediately after it has entered into a position. 
Where the trading book option is exercised, banking supervisors can 
also choose whether they want to apply the definition of own funds, 
set out in the Own Funds Directive, or the alternative definition for 
securities firms set out in this Directive. It is possible that, 
depending on the options exercised by its supervisors, a bank would 
remain subject to the Solvency Ratio risk weights on its trading book 
and aubject to the Bank Own Fund• Directive in respect of its 
regulatory capital. Even in this situation, however, banks would have 
to monitor all their risks, and their foreign exchange exposure would 
either be subject to the Capital Adequacy Directive foreign exchange 
risk requirement or subject to a ceiling on their foreign exchange 
exposure. 
4. The enumeration and classification of risks to be regulated 
The Capital Adequacy Directive proposal covers the following four 
categories of risks : 
the position risk (subdivided for debt instruments, equities and 
new issues), 
the counterparty risk, 
the foreign exchange risk, 
other risks (base risk). 
The position risk affects only the net long or short positions in 
each individual instrument. 
Different risk weights are set for the interest rate risk on debt 
instruments, depending on the credit standing of the issuer and on 
remaining maturity. 
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The market risk on equity differentiates between listed and unlisted 
shares. Firms may get a benefit. for diversification and hedging, 
taking into account for example, the delta value of options. 
For new issues a window is allowed during the first few weeks after 
the launching of a new issue, where normal risk weights may be 
reduced. There is also a penalty for concentrated positions. 
The counterparty risk requirement applies to unsettled deals. It 
starts to apply 5 days after due settlement date. It is based on the 
difference between the contract, and the market, price and it 
increases with the length of the time the deal remains unsettled. 
The foreign exchange risk requirement is intended to cover the firm's 
exposure to each foreign currency in which it has a net long or short 
position. The requirement is lower where the firm's positions are 
diversified. 
The requirement for other risks is intended to cover the risk of a 
downturn in market activity reducing the firm's current income and 
preventing it from paying its fixed overheads. It amounts to three 
months expenses paid in the previous year on fixed overhead. 
These various risk requirements are additive. 
5. Accounting and reporting requirements of those engaged in the 
securities business 
The Capital Adequacy Directive requires daily marking to market for 
· all positions, except for banks obliged by their super~isors to 
measure t~eir capital requirements using solely the Solvency Directive 
yardstick. The firm's regulatory capital needs to be equal to or 
higher than the sum of the various risk requirements at the close of 
trading. Firms must report to their authorities at set intervals and 
the latter must be able to inspect the books at any time. 
6. The definition of regulatory capital 
In principle, the Capital Adequacy Directive proposal imposes the 
definition of own funds set by the Banks Own Funds Directive. 
However, it allows Member States to use an alternative definition, 
which allows for the inclusion of more short-terms subordinated loans 
but requires the deduction of all illiquid assets on the ground.s that 
securities business requires both more flexibility and more liquidity 
than commercial banking. 
II. COMMENTARY ON THE COMMISSION'S PROPOSALS 
1. In expressing its opinion on this Capital Adequacy Directive, the 
Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee has resisted the temptation, 
never, perhaps, very great, to scrutinize in detail the complex 
analysis of risk which constitutes the main part of the Commission's 
proposals. Some of us continue to be surprised that, in a matter which 
demands probably more than most others a significant degree of 
practical understanding of the current state of the Financial Service~ 
Industry, EMAC, which is undoubtedly the best equipped of all the 
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2. Where the Committee hafl been tempted to make specific recom.-na•1d<J.t:ion:, 
for changes in this Directive, such as ir. aome aspect:a of the initial 
capital requirement under Article 3, or the counterpartyjsettlemont. 
risk provisions under Annexe 3, it has been apparent that our concern 
derives from the perception that actual market practice is alreadr 
developing along lines which tend to undermine the relevance or 
efficacy of these items. 
3. However, it is impossible to separate such specific instances from the 
general impact on these proposals of the tremendous changee that a.~e 
under way in the international securities and banking busir.ese. Our 
chosen task, in commenting on the Capital Adequacy DirectLve is 
therefore rather to consider it in the wider context of the other 
Directives which together are designed to create a single European 
market in financial services and to consider the medium term 
implications of these changes for this whole supervisory anti 
regulatory structure that is currently being put in place. 
4. As has already been pointed out in Section l.A, this Capital Adequacy 
Directive, like its companion Directives, is a compromise. It is, 
broadly speaking and for the time being, probably the best available 
compromise, and should be implemented to ensure that the single market 
programme is completed on schedule and in its entirety in this vital 
field. But it is a compromise that cannot long endure. 
5. The essence of this compromise is one that occurs right across the 
process of European integration : the conflict between centralisation 
and decentralisation, between uniformity and diversity. The problem is 
that in no other area of economic activity are the pressures towards 
centralisation and uniformity stronger than in the provision of 
financial services. 
6. Great questions, such as the future of Paris or Amsterdam as financial 
centres, the survival of independent securities firms, the 
disappearance of the distinction between banking and securities 
operations, let alone the deeper economic policy issues that lie 
behind these, such as the effective financing of European industry and 
commerce or the impact of European monetary union, or the protection 
of vital national or regional interests are being submerged by the 
incoming tide of the trading revolution which financial market 
deregulation and the application of new communications and computer 
technology over the past fifteen years has released. 
7. The increasing international form of major financial scandals, not 
least the current case of the Bank of Credit and Commercial 
International, must give rise to the gravest doubts as to whether 
anything less than a single, uniform European supervisory authority 
and regulatory regime can hope to properly protect the interests of 
investors and depositors and deal effectively with the other major 
jurisdictions of the United States and Japan. 
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8. While none of these concerns can justify not proceeding now with these 
proposals and setting in place at least a form of Community framework 
for Europe's financial services industry, they must make us recognize 
the inadequacy of what we are now undertaking and thus the need to 
simultaneously initiate a process by which these inadequacies can be 
progressively made good. To recognize that it is not presently 
politically possible to resolve all the complex issues involved in 
reaching even a decision of principle to implement at some point a 
truly uniform Community level supervisory authority and regulatory 
regime does not mean that there should not be some procedure for 
monitoring the workings of these proposals with such a possibility in 
mind. 
9. The Commission has already indicated that it intends to constantly 
review the operation cif the new supervisory and regulatory regime. 
However, the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee is not persuaded 
that the Commission alone is the appropriate body for this task. In 
the United States it is recognized that the powers of calling evidence 
and of investigation of both the Senate Banking Committee and the 
House of Representatives Commerce Committee are a critical element in 
ensuring the efficacy of the supervisory and regulatory roles of the 
Federal Reserve and the Securities and Exchange Commission. The 
Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee believes that it should be 
granted, in the light of the concerns already outlined, powers to call 
for a report on a regular basis from the various national SuPervisory 
authorities on the working of the legislative framework for the single 
European market in financial services which we have participated in 
initiating. 
10. The Committee believes this is the minimum that can be done to produce 
a politically effective forum for ensuring that the great issues which 
the ongoing process of change in the financial services markets have 
brought forward can be properly reviewed from a European rather than a 
purely national point of view and begin the process by which the 
emergence of a more thoroughgoing and effective European structure of 
supervision and regulation san come into being. 
11. The competent authorities of the Member States and any Community 
supervisory authority established subsequently shall forward to the 
European Parliament each year a comprehensive report on the progress 
and development of the single market in the field of financial 
services. 
On that occasion, the European Parliament's Committee on Economic and 
Monetary Affairs and Industrial Policy may request representatives of 
those authorities to appear in person before it to answer any 
questions concerning the reports. 
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Proposed amendment 
Article 6 - Reporting requirements 
After paragraph 3, add a new paragraph 4 z 
4. The competent authorities of the Member States and any Community 
supervisory authority established subsequently shall forward to the 
European Parliament each year a comprehensive report on the progress 
and development of the single market in the field of financial 
services. 
On that occasion, the European Parliament's Committee on Economic and 
Monetary Affairs and Industrial Policy may request representatives of 
those authorities to appear in person before it to answer any question 
concerning the reports. 
CONCLUSIONS 
1. The Economic and Monetary Affairs committee recommends that a 
provision should be placed in the Capital Adequacy Directive requiring 
relevant national supervisory and regulatory authorities to submit to 
the Parliament by way of an annual report to the Economic and Monetary 
Affairs Committee an outline of their activities and of the 
development of the Community single market in financial services. 
2. The Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee of the Parliament should 
also have the power to call upon appropriate representatives of those 
national regulatory or supervisory authorities to answer in person on 
an annual basis any questions the Committee might have arising from 
these reports. 
3. This requirement should clearly also apply to any Community level 
successor institution or institutions to these national supervisory 
and regulatory authorities. 
4. That subject to the above and the concerns expressed in this op~n~on 
as to its inevitably provisional nature, the Economic and Monetary 
Affairs Committee supports the Commission's proposals for the Capital 
Adequacy Directive. 
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